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neighborhood blight, the resulting high cost of municipal services, and the
detrimental effect on adjoining property values and home environment
make a strong case for municipal regulation. The compelling public
necessity to protect property development should place amortization plans
completely within the realm of reasonable regulation.
SECTION 8(d) 4 LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT TO STRIKE:
A CRITICISM
There can be little doubt that the right to strike is an integral part
of any system of collective bargaining' without which employees have
no effective bargaining power.2 Strikes, of course, may be undesirable
for a number of reasons: They may cause inconvenience and perhaps
hardship to the general public3 and under some circumstances may be
injurious to the entire economy. Strikes often inflict serious economic
loss, not only upon the employer but also upon the individual employees
engaged in the activity.' The right to strike is, nevertheless, an indis-
pensable element of the right to bargain collectively; it represents the
power which, even if not used, constitutes the foundation of the union's
1. The Norris-LaGuardia Act and the NLRA, which were specifically created
for the establishing, sanctioning, and protecting of collective bargaining, both specific-
ally provide for the right to strike. "No court of the United States shall have juris-
diction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case
involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons par-
ticipating or interested in such dispute . . . from doing, whether singly or in concert
any of the following acts: (a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to re-
main in any relation of employment." Norris-LaGuardia Act § 4, 47 STAT. 70 (1932),
29 U.S.C. § 104 (1952). "Employees shall have the right . . . to engage in concerted
activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection."
National Labor Relations Act § 7, 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1952).
2. Professor Frey of the University of Pennsylvania Law School stated that the
employee has no effective bargaining power "unless those who can perform the jobs
in a given bargaining unit are able to act as one man, and unless that 'one man' is
given the privilege which any individual has of refusing to work upon the terms or
under the conditions proferred. . . ." Rose, The Right to Strike: Is it an Inalienable
Right of Free Man?, 36 A.B.A.J. 439, 520 (1950).
3. In spite of this fact, Senator Taft himself admitted the need for the right to
strike: "We recognize that right [the right to strike] in spite of the inconvenience,
and in some cases perhaps danger, to the people of the United States which may result
from the exercise of such.right." 93 CONG. REC. 3951 (1947).
4. "Regardless of who initiates such action, both parties are, of course, subjected
to costs. In the event of a strike, aimed at the employer's business operations, the
employees too are subjected to a cost-their loss of wages-and it will be the em-
ployer's estimate of how long his employees will submit to such loss that will partly-
determine his estimate of the duration of the strike and consequently the cost to him
of rejecting the union's terms." CHAMBERLAIN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 223 (1st ed.
1951).
NOTES
bargaining position.5 Any curtailment of the right involves the danger
of weakening the very basis of collective bargaining.6
The Taft-Hartley Act has often been criticized for certain provi-
sions limiting the right to strike.' One of these restrictive provisions is
contained in section 8(d) which requires a sixty day notice before a
collective bargaining contract can be terminated or modified. Strikes
and lock-outs, within this sixty day period are prohibited as a refusal
to bargain, constituting an unfair labor practice under the act.' The
unfortunate language of this section has resulted in a considerable
amount of confusion in its interpretation, the precise problem being
whether the prohibition to strike applies only to a sixty day period after
notice has been given or to the entire duration of the contract.
In the case of United Packinghouse Workers9 the collective bar-
gaining contract contained a reopening clause for the purpose of wage
adjustments. Modifications concerning a wage raise were demanded
prematurely and after a 60 day notice period a strike was called by the
union. The Company filed a complaint requesting a cease and desist
order. The NLRB held that section 8(d) required merely a sixty day
notice period before the strike, regardless of the expiration or modifi-
cation date agreed upon by the parties. The opinion stated that in view
of the purpose and spirit of the act it would be illogical to extend the
5. ". . . the threat to strike, and the strike itself, are the prods which stimulate
management and unions to find a peaceful solution to the problems of employment.
Indeed, the strike is an integral part of the collective bargaining process. Without it,
collective bargaining cannot function effectively as the vehicle of joint determination
of the issues of the employment relationship." WITNEY, GOVERNMENT AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 3 (1951).
6. The following statement illustrates the fundamental nature of the right to
strike in collective bargaining: "To those who regard collective bargaining as a mar-
keting procedure, involving the sale of labor service, the strike and lockout, for example
may be upheld as necessary to a freedom not to contract, as an alternative to a forced
sale or purchase. On these grounds limitations on these rights might be opposed in
principle." CHAMBERLAIN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 237.
7. WITNEY, op. cit. supra note 5, at 405-425.
8. Section 8(d) defines the duty to bargain collectively. Where there is a dollec-
tive bargaining agreement in effect, a party must (1) refrain from termination or
modification of the contract unless it serves a written notice of the proposed termi-
nation or modification upon the other party sixty days prior to the expiration date of
the contract, (2) offer to meet for negotiations, (3) notify the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service within thirty days after such notice, and (4) continue ". . . in
full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lock-out, all the terms and condi-
tions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after such notice is given or
until the expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs later."
The section also provides that any employee who engages in a strike within the
sixty-day period shall lose his status as an employee, for the purposes of the Act.
Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), § 8(d), 61 STAT. 142, 29
U.S.C. § 158(d) (1952).
9. 89 N.L.R.B. 310 (1950).
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prohibition against strikes to the entire life of the contract."0 As the
union had given the required notice, the complaint of the Wilson Com-
pany was dismissed."
Wilsol. & Co.,' 2 the second case arising from the same nation-wide
dispute, involved circumstances similar to those in the first case. In
this instance, however, the union was seeking relief in the form of
reinstatement of employees who were discharged as a result of their
participation in the strike. The strike was called after the expiration
of the sixty day period at a time when the terms of the contract pro-
vided for reopening. The Board ordered reinstatement, 3 pursuant to
section 10(c) of the act.' This decision of the NLRB was reversed
and the action dismissed on appeal to the Eighth Circuit.' The court
held that the parties were required to continue the terms of the existing
contract without resorting to strike until the expiration date or for a
period of sixty days after notice has been given, "whichever occurs
later." It was stated that the language of section 8(d)4 was not am-
10. Id. at 313.
11. The contract between the union and Wilson company provided for reopening
for wage adjustment "once during the term of the agreement," but not within 12
months of the signing thereof. Id. at 326. The Union demanded wage adjustment prior
to the expiration of the 12 months period. The union claimed that the contract itself
was merely a skeleton of the relationship between the employees and the company, and
there was a tacit understanding that every time the other three members of the "Big
Four," the major packing companies, granted a raise to their employees, the employees
of Wilson Company would receive a similar raise. Id. at 327. The union failed to
prove materially this contention, however, and the trial examiner found for the com-
pany. His decision was based on Section 8(d)4 of the LMRA, which, in his interpre-
tation, prohibited a strike before the expiration date of the contract, or before the date
designated for contract modification. Id. at 336.
The sole issue considered by the Board was whether the strike constituted a re-
fusal to bargain because the union failed to comply with the requirements of Section
8(d)4. The majority opinion admitted that a purely literal interpretation of the section
would sustain the trial examiner's decision. However, the Board held that such inter-
pretation would be obviously contrary to the policy and specific purposes of the Act.
Id. at 313. It was held that the "whichever occurs later" provision was specifically
directed at a situation in which notice of a desire to modify or terminate a contract
was given less than sixty days before the expiration of the contract. Id. at 316. Ac-
cording to the Board opinion a strike after the expiration of the sixty-day notice period
would not be a violation of Section 8(d).
Chairman Herzog and Member Murdock, in their separate concurring opinions,
maintained that Section 8(d) should not apply in the present case at all, as it was only
intended to regulate strikes near the expiration time of a contract, and not disturb-
ances which occurred during the term of the agreement. Id. at 319, 323.
12. 105 N.L.R.B. 823 (1953).
13. The Board followed its own decision in the United Packinghouse Workers
case, holding that since the strike occurred more than sixty days after notice had been
given, the requirements of Section 8(d)4 were satisfied. Consequently, the individuals
who engaged in the strike did not lose their status as employees. Id. at 825, 826.
14. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), § 10(c), 61 STAT.
147, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1952).
15. Wilson & Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 210 F.2d 325 (8th Cir.
1954).
NOTES
biguous, and that, by express provision, it prohibited any strike for
modification before the expiration date of the contract. The court stated
further that, even if the contract itself provided for reopening and
secured the right to strike at the date set for such modification, a strike
would still be unlawful under the act. "Contracts, however express,
cannot fetter the constitutional authority of Congress.""
A similar situation arose in the Lion Oil Co. case,17 where the con-
tract provided for reopening after sixty day notice; an additional sixty
days after a second notice was required for termination. Only one no-
tice was served and, after the passage of a substantial period (more
than sixty days), a strike was called. Here the contract had not expired,
but the union had, under its terms, a right to reopen. The NLRB took
the position that, while the LMRA outlawed all strikes for modification
before the expiration of the contract, strikes were permitted if a time
was designated for modification. Although reversing its position in the
first Wilson case, the NLRB did not go along entirely with the second
Wilson decision.18 It remains to be seen whether or not the Eighth Cir-
cuit will affirm the Board's position on this point."0
In the cases, section 8(d)4 has been subjected to three different
interpretations, all three claiming to be substantiated by legislative his-
tory. The NLRB, its dissenting members, and the circuit court all at-
tempt to support their positions by quotations from committee reports
16. The court cited the following parts of a District Court opinion, involving the
same contract, the same union, and the same strike, as the correct statement of the
laws: ". . . the complaint shows on its face that plaintiffs, by 'resorting to strike'
. . . 'before the expiration date of such contract,' have violated the express mandate
of Section 8(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947. Plaintiffs contend
that their contract gave them the right to strike during its term. After the passage of
the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, such a contention would be contrary to
the express policy of the Act and Section 8 thereof. Contracts, however, express, can-
not fetter the constitutional authority of Congress." United Packinghouse Workers v.
Wilson & Co., Inc., 80 F. Supp. 563, 569 (N.D. Ill. 1948). When the case was ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court, the NLRB asked the court not to consider it on the
ground that the issues were not clearly drawn.. The court denied review. Local No. 3.
United Packinghouse Workers v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 348 U.S. 822 (1954).
17. Lion Oil Co., 23 U.S.L. IVVEEIc 2090 (NLRB August 5, 1954).
18. The Board followed the Eighth Circuit's decision in the Wilson case in de-
claring that there could be no strikes for modification before the expiration date of
the contract, even after the expiration of the sixty-day notice period. However, it held
that the "expiration date" of a contract as used by Congress also means the date in the
course of a labor agreement when the contract, by its own terms, is subject to either
modification or termination. This is clearly in conflict with the Eighth Circuit's view.
23 U.S.L. WEEx 2090 (NLRB Aug. 5, 1954).
19. Petition for review of Lion Oil was filed with the Eighth Circuit on August
23, 1954. See Note, 64 YALE L.J. 248, 258 (1954).
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or congressional debates used in more than one instance out of context.2"
These conflicting results indicate that legislative history offers a some-
what vague and indefinite picture of the applicability of section 8(d)4.
While a careful study of the debates and proceedings which preceded
the enactment of the section reveals no express conclusions as to the
true meaning of the section, it .seems fairly clear that the interpreta-
tion by the Eighth Circuit receives no support from the legislative his-
tory.21
After the Taft-Hartley Act had been in operation for a year, there
were admissions from its proponents that a number of the act's provi-
sions had had unforeseen consequences detrimental to the promotion and
strengthening of collective bargaining. Section 8(d)4, because of the
lack of clarity of its proper application, was listed among these provi-
sions." Senator Taft, during debates concerning an amendment to the
LMRA, admitted the presence of such a defect, and proposed an amend-
ment to make it clear that a strike after sixty days, but before the ex-
piration date of the contract, in the presence of a reopening clause,
would not constitute an unfair labor practice.22 This amendment would
have stricken out the fatal words "whichever occurs later. ' 2' The pur-
pose of section 8(d), according to Senator Taft, was to give the Con-
ciliation Service advance notice of disputes so that it could be alert to
prevent stoppages. 2 During the debates preceding the passage of the
act, Senator Taft pointed out that, "we have done nothing to outlaw
strikes for basic wages, hours, and working conditions after a proper
opportunity for mediation.
-26
20. The Eighth Circuit and the NLRB both emphasize the fact that Congress
considered the prohibition of breaches of contracts as essential to industrial stability.
To support this prosition the Eighth Circuit quotes the Senate Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare: "If unions can break agreements with relative impunity, then
such agreements do not tend to stabilize industrial relations. . . . Without some effec-
tive method of assuring freedom from economic warfare for the term of the agree-
ment there is little reason why an employer would desire to sign such a contract."
Wilson & Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 210 F.2d 325, 332 (8th Cir.
1954). The above discussions on industrial stability were actually not directed to Sec-
tion 8(d), but to Section 301, allowing suits to be brought in federal courts against
labor organizations for damages. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1947).
21. For detailed discussion see Note, 64 YALE L.J. 248, 252 (1954).
22. See S. REP. No. 99, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1949).
23. Senator Taft made the following statement presenting the views of the Senate
minority at the discussion of possible amendment of the LMRA: "The Taft-Hartley
Act's definition also contains a possible defect in that it is not clear that a strike after
sixty days' notice under an annual reopening clause of a contract running for more
than 1 year does not constitute a violation. . . . The amendment proposed below makes
it clear that such a strike would not constitute an unfair labor practice." Id. at pt.
2, 27.
24. Id. at 72.
25. Id. at 27.
26. 93 CONG. Rac. 3835 (1947).
NOTES
The draftsmen of the act were obviously concerned only with the
usual problem of renegotiation of a contract at its expiration date, or
with contracts with automatic renewal clauses, and had attempted to
avoid occurence of strikes and violence at the critical expiration time."
The possibility that this section might be construed to be applicable to
strikes during the life of the contract was pointed out in the Senate
Minority Report.28 Some of the legislators may have actually consid-
ered this a desirable result; others perhaps did not believe that such
meaning could be read into the act. It is very likely that most of the
legislators did not really appreciate the danger of such an interpretation.
The present interpretation of section 8(d)4 cannot be justified on
the theory that Congress intended to make labor contracts enforceable
through this section. Senator Taft was certainly in favor of making
collective bargaining agreements binding upon the parties and of invok-
ing government power to enforce such agreements. He agreed with
Senator Morse that there should be some provision to prevent the par-
ties from violating their agreements "with impunity."2 Senator Morse
would have recommended making breaches of collective bargaining con-
tracts unfair labor practices, and, as an alternatitve, would have pro-
vided damage suits for such breaches." Even he stated that the duty to
bargain collectively does not cease with the signing of the contract, for
when the terms of the contract become unfair as a result of circum-
stances which were not foreseen, the parties should not be permitted to
refuse discussion of modifications of its terms." Even if breaches of
27. According to Senator Ball the purpose Section 8(d) sought to accomplish was
to protect the public from so called "quickie-strikes" by "giving at least 60 days
notice of the termination of the contract, or of the desire for any change in it." S.
RP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1947). Mr. Hartley's presentation of the
Senate Bill in the House (the original House Bill did not contain the 60 day notice
provision) also confirms the conclusion that the notice period was to apply only at the
termination date of the contract, for the purpose of affording time to settle disputes
with the aid of the Mediation Service, before resorting to work stoppages. H. R. REP.
245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1947).
28. The Senate Minority Report pointed out that Section 8(d) in effect incorpor-
ates no-strike clauses in collective bargaining contracts "by legislative fiat." S. RiP.
No. 105, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1947).
29. When discussing the amendment of the LMRA, Senator Taft said: "Since
our whole national labor policy is based upon achieving peaceful labor relations through
collective bargaining between employers and unions, the success of the policy depends
upon the extent to which both parties faithfully observe the contract arrived at in the
bargaining conferences. The knowledge that the other party is legally bound to carry
out its commitments under the contract will do more to promote true collective bar-
gaining than any mandatory provision that we may write." S. REP. No. 99, pt. 2, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1949).
30. 93 CONG. Rxc. 1558 (1947).
31. During the debates preceding the enactment of the LMRA Senator Morse
made the following statement: "It is not going to help peaceful relations between
management and labor in this country if, once a contract is made, the employer and
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contracts were treated as unfair labor practices, Senator Morse would
not have approved a provision like 8(d)4 under the Eighth Circuit in-
terpretation, which would bar all attempts to modify contract terms
during the life of the agreement. The right to strike is manifestly essen-
tial in any attempt at modification.
The Senate amendment to the NLRA contained a provision making
the violation of the terms of a collective bargaining contract an unfair
labor practice. The conference agreement omitted this provision for the
reason that, "once the parties have made a collective contract the en-
forcement of the contract should be left to the usual processes of the
law and not to the NLRB. ' 3 " To lend force to collective bargaining
agreements Congress opened the federal courts to suits for breaches of
labor contracts. Section 301 was enacted for the purpose of requiring
the parties to abide by their agreements. 3 It is evident that this section,
not section 8(d), was intended to serve this purpose. Nowhere do
Senator Taft, or any of the immediate authors of the act, talk about
alternative methods for the enforcement of labor contracts.
The court in the Wilson case insisted that the language of the Act
was unambiguous and that nothing was left for them but to follow the
clearly expressed legislative policy."4 In view of the admissions of the
section's confusing nature by its creators, the finding of clarity by the
court seems unjustifiable.3" Section 8(d) imposes the following sanc-
tion upon violators; employees who engage in strikes during the sixty
day period lose their employee status and become ineligible for reinstate-
ment under the act.3" No sanction is imposed upon employees who
strike after expiration of the notice period but before the end of the
contract.3 The court, nevertheless, when imposing this punishment
upon such employees, claims to be supported by the "unambiguous" lan-
guage of the act.
The express policy of Congress, as found by the court, evidently
the union may thereafter refuse even to discuss modification of its terms, no matter
how unfair or erroneous they may have become, because of circumstances that were
not foreseen when the contract was signed." Id. at 1557.
32. H. R. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1947).
33. Section 301 of the LMRA permits suits for violations of labor contracts in the
federal district courts, in the absence of the ordinary requirements of federal juris-
diction. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), § 301, 61 STAT.
156, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1952).
34. The court declared: "It [the language of Section 8(d)4] is not ambiguous
and cannot be amended by interpretation." 210 F.2d at 332.
35. See note 30 supra.
36. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), § 8(d), 61 STAT.
142, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1952).
37. This obvious inconsistency in the language of Section 8(d) is pointed out in
the majority opinion in United Packinghouse Workers, 89 N.L.R.B. 310, 314 (1950).
NOTES
prohibits all strikes supporting modification demands once a collective
bargaining agreement is signed. This requirement does not honor the
actual terms of the agreement; the contract in the Wilsonr case expressly
provided for reopening and modification during its term. This results
in the compulsory inclusion of terms in the contract regardless of the
actual intention of the parties. A promise not to strike, the so-called
"no-strike clause," is embodied in the agreement although neither the
union nor the employer bargained for such provision.
The desirability of no-strike clauses is widely recognized in the
field of industrial relations. More than eighty percent of all collective
bargaining agreements contain some form of a no-strtike provision,"
illustrating the fact that employers and employees realize that they are
benefited by the limitation or prevention of strikes. At first glance one
may find it reasonable for Congress to include no-strike clauses in all
contracts, but this disregards the basic principles of collective bargain-
ing which call for agreements arrived at by the parties themselves on a
voluntary basis.3" Collective bargaining is the product of the recogni-
tion that the complex problems of labor relations can be regulated best
by the parties involved.4" These contracts must operate in many entirely
different situations. Each industry, each individual plant, each geo-
graphic area has its own peculiar problems. Certain contract provisions
may be advantageous to both labor and management in a certain indus-
try, while the same terms would not be desirable in others. Any attempt
to embody no-strike clauses into labor contracts by legislative fiat
amounts to compulsory prescription of the contents of labor agreements,
and, in effect, this protedure would replace part of the collective bar-
gaining process.4
A study of existing no-strike clauses shows a variety of situations
and methods under which the device has been put to use. A n6-strike
clause is not simply a union agreement to refrain from any strikes dur-
ing the term of the contract, for usually there are important qualifica-
38. See Wolk and Nix, Work Stoppage Provisions in Union Agreements, 74
MONTHLY LABOR REV. 272, 273 (1952); WITNEY, GOVERN IENT AND COLLECTIVE BAR-
GAINING 398 (1951).
39. The Senate Minority Report objected to this result, stating: "Although we
believe that such provisions [no-strike clauses] are eminently desirable, it is our fur-
ther belief that such agreements should be reached voluntarily on friendly, collective
bargaining." S. REP. No. 105, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1947).
40. The institution of collective bargaining, as part of a political democracy, is
based on the ideals of self rule and government according to law. Cox, Some Aspectv
of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1947).
41. Professor Frey stated: ". . . legislation which curtails the right to strike,
thus in effect eliminating collective bargaining, is not an expedient way to protect the
public interest, for the consequences of the cure may too readily be worse than the
disease." Rose, supra note 2, at 520.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
tions made.42 Many no-strike provisions limit the union's liability for
breach of contract to strikes which are called or supported by the offi-
cials of the union. This means that damage suits under section 301 are
unavailable in disputes resulting in unpredictable wildcat strikes engi-
neered by irresponsible members of the union. Even more important
are the provisions which preserve the right to strike in connection with
disputes on certain specified subjects. Some problems are considered
too important to be submitted to arbitration or permanently fixed for
a long period at the time of signing the contract. 4  All these provisions
which the union and management have readily accepted as reasonable
measures will lose their effect under the new interpretation of section
8(d)4; a new and unqualified no-strike clause will take their place.
A legislative prohibition of strikes lacks the beneficial effects of a
voluntary no-strike clause since the real purpose of a no-strike clause is
to secure the promise of union leadership, not only to refrain from calling
strikes, but also to cooperate with the company in preventing and con-
trolling unauthorized wildcat strikes.45 The former is the less impor-
tant purpose, since responsible union leaders do not call strikes in viola-
tion of a contract which was negotiated by them; this is especially true
in view of the liability imposed upon the unions by section 301. Wild-
cat strikes constitute one of the most serious problems in labor rela-
tions.46 Congressional prohibition would be completely ineffective
against such strikes;4 the only effective method of suppressing them
is through responsible and powerful union leadership. The acceptance
of union security clauses by management representatives indicates an
awareness of the union's importance in resolving these conflicts. Only
44. For a detailed study of limitations of union liability under no-strike provisions
the Bureau of Labor Statistics nearly 90 percent includes some form of a limitation
on work stoppages. In 56 percent of these contracts the limitation was not absolute,
and the agreements contained exceptions or specific conditions under which strikes
were permissible. Wolk and Nix, supra note 38, at 274.
43. Under this "nonsuability" arrangement the union usually is obligated to take
positive action to terminate the unauthorized strike. WITNEY, GOVERNMtENT AND COL-
LEcTIVE BARGAINING 399 (1951).
44. For a detailed study of limitations of union liability under no-strike provisions
see Fulda, The No-Strike Clause in READINGS ON LABOR LAW 133-136 (Temporary ed.
September, 1953).
45. Id. at 134. See also note 43 supra.
46. The great majority of strikes in violation of no-strike clauses are unauthorized.
The International Longshoremen & Warehousemen's Union, for example, during a
five year period engaged in more than one thousand "quickie" strikes in violation of
their contract. Hearings Before the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare of the
Senate, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. on S. 55 and S. J. REs. 22, pt. 2, at 635 (1947).
47. Any form of injunction against individual workers would not only be imprac-
tical, but also unconstitutional, as imposing involuntary servitude. U. S. CONST. amend.
XIII, § 1. Section 301 of the LMRA, in the presence of a union "nonsuability clause"
will also be ineffective against wild-cat strikes.
NOTES
under such an arrangement can union leaders maintain the discipline
which is so essential to the avoidance of unauthorized strikes.4" The
Wilson case, by embodying a no-strike clause in every collective bar-
gaining agreement, largely eliminates this important function of union
leadership. 9
Perhaps the most objectionable feature of the Wilson decision is
the fact it renders ineffective the insertion of reopening dates as a pro-
vision of the contract; a right to reopen and modify is meaningless
without the right to strike. The flexible, practical system of collective
bargaining, which facilitates the solution of labor problems, will suffer
a serious setback if this theory prevails. While the purpose of the
NLRA admittedly is to encourage collective bargaining,"0 the Wilson
interpretation will hardly serve to induce parties to negotiate long term
labor contracts." The NLRB in the Lion Oil case seems to have recog-
nized this weakness in the Wilson decision. The Board rejected the
theory that contract reopening clauses are contrary to congressional
policy, and declared that a strike called after the expiration of the sixty
days is illegal only in the absence of a provision for reopening.12 This
decision still embodies a no-strike clause in every labor contract which
does not provide for modification.
The Board presents a number of arguments to justify its position.
It is contended that strikes must be outlawed during the term of a labor
agreement in order to insure stability in industrial relations. If unions
agree to a fixed contract and are then permitted to seek a modification
of its terms, the Board argues that labor contracts will become mean-
ingless. If strikes to support modifications are outlawed, the parties
will be forced to honor their contractual obligations. This will result
in a mutual feeling of security on both sides and will insure more sta-
bility in labor-management relations, at least for the period of the con-
tract. Once the contract is signed, it is the Board's position that its
48. Senator Murray made the following observation: "It is only under a union
shop or maintenance of membership that union leaders can most effectively maintain
union discipline, which is so essential to avoidance of unauthorized strikes. Union
security is not opposed but, on the contrary, strengthens company security." 93 CONG.
Rxc. A 895 (1947).
49. If an unconditional no-strike clause will be read into every collective bar-
gaining contract, provisions limiting union liability will lose their effect, and union
leaders will have little reason to make an express promise to cooperate actively in the
suppression of wildcat strikes.
50. "It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce . . . by en-
couraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining...." National Labor
Relations Act § 1, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. 151 (1952).
51. Note, 64 YALE LJ. 248, 258 (1954).
52. See note 18 supra.
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fixed terms should be strictly adhered to. 3
On the surface this reasoning seems to have some merit. Bargain-
ing in good faith is one of the primary requirements imposed upon the
parties by the act," and a party who merely goes through the motions of
bargaining without intending to come to an agreement is, at least in
theory, violating the law. Analogously, a party who goes through the
bargaining process and agrees to a fixed contract without any intention
of honoring the terms of such agreement seems equally guilty of an
unfair labor practice. An intention to abide by the terms of the con-
tract is an integral part of bargaining in good faith. Developing this
further, the conclusion might be reached that any party who refuses to
be bound by the terms of such contract was not bargaining in good
faith. 6
The above position assumes that a collective bargaining agreement
which does not expressly provide for reopening includes a tacit promise
that no modification will be demanded; consequently, a strike for this
purpose could not occur." This theory seems to be directly contrary to
the actual practice observed in collective bargaining. Instead of em-
bodying express provisions permitting strikes, the practice is, if the
parties desire to avoid strikes, to include an express promise not to
strike. This procedure seems to imply that the right exists in the ab-
53. The Board in the opinion made the following statement: "We say only that
strikes to alter the provisions of a firm contract of fixed duration, and containing no
provision for modification, must await the termination date." 23 U.S.L. WEK, 2090,
2091 (NLRB Aug. 5, 1954).
54. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), § 8(a)5, (b)3;
§ 8(d), 61 STAT. 140, 142, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a), (b), (d) (1952).
55. Section 8(d), defining collective bargaining, makes good faith a necessary
requirement.
56. "There seem to be strong grounds for arguing that while the union can insist
upon reasonable conditioning and definition of its liability for strikes during the con-
tract period, it cannot arbitrarily demand a total release from responsibility without
committing an unfair labor practice. To do so is to refuse the employer the only sub-
stantial consideration he receives, and it is difficult to see how the union can make such
refusal and still fulfill its duty to bargain collectively in good faith." Livengood, Labor
Contracts and the Taft-Hartley Act, 26 N.C.L. REv. 1, 14 (1947).
57. There is some authority indicating that even in the absence of no-strike pro-
visions there is an implied obligation not to resort to methods of economic pressure,
like a slowdown or strike, in order to enforce a modification demand. The cases, how-
ever, which uphold this principle, involve contracts providing for settlement of disputes
by arbitration or through the grievance procedure. Courts and labor arbitrators held
that the parties were obliged to exhaust these methods provided for by the contract
before a strike would be permissible. NLRB v. Dorsey Trailers, Inc., 179 F.2d 589
(5th Cir. 1950) ; Universal Dishwashing Machinery Co., 17 L.A. 737, 738 (Th. ..
Reynolds 1952) ; Fabet Corporation, 12 L.A. 1126, 1129 (S. Wallen 1949); Waterfront
Employers' Association of Pacific Coast, 9 L.A. 5, 11 (A. C. Miller 1947). This rule
falls far short of an absolute implication of a promise not to strike, read into the con-
tract by Wilson and Lion Oil.
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sence of a no-strike clause."8 This argument was developed by the
union's counsel in the first Wilson. case, when he pointed out that if the
employer does not bargain for a no-strike clause, he is not entitled to
freedom from strikes."
Even if the proposition that a no-strike provision should be im-
plied in every contract were to be conceded, the Lion Oil decision would
still be unjustified. There is clear evidence that Congress did not in-
tend to make violations of a labor agreement an unfair labor practice."°
Cases construing the LMRA support this proposition. Earlier cases
show that where the contract contained a no-strike clause, and the union
struck because of the employer's unfair labor practices, such employees
were not protected by the act.6 Even though the employees were vio-
lating their contract, these cases did not hold that such strikes consti-
tuted unfair labor practices.62 The Mastro Plastic Corporation case,
which reversed the courts' position in regard to protection under the
act, held that employees who struck under such circumstances retained
their right to reinstatement. 3 While there was a breach of the no-strike
clause in the Mastro case, it was held not to affect the operation of the
act in favor of the employees. This demonstrates that there is no logi-
cal relationship between breaches of contract and unfair labor practices.
Strikes, even though carried out in violation of a collective bargaining
agreement, involve a "labor dispute." They should be protected, not
prohibited by the act and cannot be considered unfair labor practices,
subject to injunction, unless the Norris-LaGuardia Act is to be rendered
ineffective.64 An unfair labor practice is a public wrong, subject to
injunction.65 To declare that breaches of contracts constitute public
58. See Note, 54 COL. L. REV. 1006 (1954).
59. Union's Exception to Intermediate Report, p. 12, United Packinghouse Workers
89 N.L.R.B. 310 (1950).
60. See page 544 supra.
61. NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939); United Elastic Corporation,
84 N.L.R.B. 768 (1949) ; J. Dyson & Sons, Inc., 72 N.L.R.B. 445 (1947) ; Scullin Steel
Company, 65 N.L.R.B. 1294 (1946).
62. The NLRB in these cases did not hold breaches of contract unfair labor prac-
tices. The NLRB refused to intervene for the protection of employees who by such
activities exposed themselves to countermeasures by the employer. Breach of contract
was described as "wrongful", but not "unlawful" conduct. Levinson, Breach of Con-
tract Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 2 LAB. L.J. 279, 282 (1951).
63. NLRB v. Mastro Plastic Corp., 214 F.2d 462 (2d Cir. 1954); cert. granted,
348 U.S. 910 (1955).
64. The Act adopts the view that collective agreements are in some respects mu-
tually enforceable by employer and union, through orthodox contract remedies. Such
actions, however, are subject to the limitations of anti-injunction statutes, such as the
Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts. Livengood, supra note 56, at 7.
65. The NLRB is empowered to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair
labor practice and may petition federal circuit and district courts to enforce its re-
straining orders. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), § 10(a)
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wrongs would mark the initiation of a new theory in the law, of inde-
terminable consequences. Congress realized the absurdity of such a
proposition and refused to make breaches of labor agreements unfair
labor practices.66 On this basis, the Board's reasoning in support of the
Lion Oil decision seems untenable.
The Wilson and Lion Oil decisions represent efforts to establish a
legal theory for union contracts which would lend binding force to the
terms of such agreements. They show an awareness of the fact that the
authors of the LMRA strongly believed that collective bargaining could
create stability only if the agreements were made binding through the
utilization of government power.67 While even the soundness of this
belief may be seriously questioned, the interpretations of 8(d)4 in W'Vil-
son and Lion Oil seem to conflict with the general provisions of the
LMRA itself. Section 13 declares in express language that: "Nothing
in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed
so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right
to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right."6
It seems that in interpreting the ambiguous and confusing language of
section 8(d)4, the policy established in section 13 should receive serious
consideration.
Even the soundness of the 60 day notice provision and the damage
suit provision of section 301 may be questioned. Supposedly these sec-
tions were enacted with the purpose of strengthening economic stability
and thereby protecting the general public. Actually they govern strikes
which do not endanger the national economy. Title II of the LMRA
provides adequate safeguards against large scale strikes.69 It is difficult
to see why the Government should interfere with strikes of limited scope.
The provisions of the LMRA which attempt to regulate strikes not hav-
ing national significance are directly conflicting with the purpose of the
act-the furtherance and encouragement of collective bargaining.76 Un-
necessary government regulation of bargaining agreements involves the
and (e), 61 STAT. 146, 147, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a), (e) (1952).
66. See page 544 supra.
67. See note 30 supra.
68. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act, § 13, 61 STAT.
151, 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1952).
69. Id. §§ 206, 207, 208, 209.
70. Professor W. W. Wirtz of Northwestern University says: "It is hard to
understand why we have in fact gone out of our way to discourage, in Section 8(d)
of the 1947 version of the NLRA, the orthodox procedure of amending these agree-
ments if the need for amendment arises during the contract term." Wirtz, Collective
Bargaining: Lawyers' Role in Negotiations and Arbitrations, 34 A.B.A.J. 547, 549
(1948).
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very real danger of destroying the collective bargaining process."
Section 301, by providing for damage suits in federal courts for
breaches of labor contracts, also represents an undesirable form of
governmental interference with labor agreements. This section is of
rather questionable value even when limited to the purpose for which
it was enacted. While in isolated cases the prospect of a damage suit
may serve as a deterrent to would-be violators of collective bargaining
contracts, generally it does not provide the relief actually desired by the
injured party. Employers are interested in continuous production and
security not in the uncertain prospect of collecting damages from their
employees. - The employment relationship is a continuing one in which
good will and good faith of the two parties are essential. Damage suits
are hardly the device to promote the desired harmony. 3 The possible
harmful effects of such suits have been recognized by management, and
there is evidence that Section 301 has not been extensively used." The
obvious inadequacy of this section may have prompted the judges and
NLRB members in Wilson and Lion. Oil to seek "solution" through
their interpretation of 8(d)4."7
71. Experience with the War Labor Board shows that the immediate availability
of an agency for settling disputes discourages the parties from settling such disputes
themselves by voluntary adjustment. S. REP. No. 105, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 12
(1947).
72. "A firm remains prosperous, not by collecting money damages from labor
unions, but by selling goods and services to customers. Regular production, free from
unauthorized work stoppages, is a prime requisite for the healthful financial conditions
of a business enterprise." WITNEY, GOVERNMENT AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 395
(1951).
73. See Cox, supra note 40, at 313.
74. As far as court decisions are concerned, the deluge of damage suits against
unions has not materialized up to this time. On the contrary, the number of reported
cases involving damage suits by employers against unions for breach of the no-strike
clause is very small. Fulda, op. cit. supra note 44, at 124.
75. Unfortunately the method employed in these cases is not only an irrational
one but also entirely unsuited to the smooth operation of the collective bargaining
system. These decisions are founded upon the theory that collective bargaining con-
tracts, to be effective, must be subject to strict interpretation and enforcement. This
position shows a fatal misunderstanding of the basic nature of collective bargaining.
The collective bargaining contract is very different from an ordinary contract,
therefore ordinary contract principles cannot be applied to it. Collective bargaining is
a flexible system which cannot be squeezed within narrow limitations. Such agree-
ments are in effect legislative enactments which contemplate, for their administration,
the exercise of administrative and judicial functions. They represent a system of rules
which should govern in settling labor disputes. They do not cover every detail of
industrial life. Subjects labeled as management prerogatives do not constitute parts of
the contract, yet they are an integral part and influence upon the production process
and, as such, will affect employee interests indirectly. There are many direct issues
left which must be decided at a later date when the actual necessity arises. Unlike ordi-
nary contracts, collective agreements must leave ample room for future determination
of issues. Thus when the Board in the Lion Oil case talks about "fixed terms" of a
labor contract, it falls victim to error. Labor contracts, by their very nature and use-
fulness cannot have fixed terms, and if they had such unchangeable provisions requir-
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While it is true that healthy industrial relations cannot be achieved
if collective bargaining agreements are not honored by the parties, the
solution to the problem does not lie in the approach resorted to in the
Wilson and Lion Oil cases. Legislation which limits the respective rights
of the parties under the contract is not only a curtailment of the freedom
to contract and of the right to settle disputes on the basis of mutual
understanding, but it is also an extremely impractical device. Congress
may pass laws, or the courts may read certain interpretations into such
acts but, if the unions and management do not acquiesce, these enact-
ments will have little effect. Parties negotiating future labor contracts
have a variety of devices at their disposal for avoiding the effect of the
Wilson and Lion Oil decisions."0 If the Wilson decision is to prevail,
short term labor contracts with automatic renewal clauses are the answer;
this will enable the unions to modify their agreements at frequent in-
tervals. The effect of Lion Oil will be nullified if union contracts in-
clude reopening provisions. Neither of these developments is particularly
desirable for the promotion of economic stability, but the two decisions
virtually compel their use.''
ing strict adherence, excluding reasonable argument and determination according to
sound plant policies, they would be obstacles to not promoters of industrial harmony.
Literal enforcement of labor contracts endangers their very purpose.
76. See Note, 64 YALE L.J. 249, 258 (1954).
77. The fact that statutory or judicial regulations may be rendered ineffective with
such ease points to the conclusion that the shaping of labor policies can be done effec-
tively only by the parties involved. Senator Murray pointed this out, stating: "Com-
pliance with contract terms must ultimately depend upon the parties themselves, supple-
mented by expert and impartial arbitration. Collective bargaining, somewhat like mar-
riage, is a social relationship which depends upon continuity. It is a living together
which cannot be safely interrupted while the bones of contention are being rattled in
the courts." 93 CoNG. REc. A 895 (1947). If labor agreements shall be honored let
the union and management realize that adherence in good faith to their agreements
serves not only their mutual benefit, but in fact it is essential to their most vital in-
terests. Effective and continuous production and secure and fair wages are the pri-
mary objectives of the parties.
The view that collective bargaining should be closely regulated by the government
is based on the quite unjustifiable belief that union and management, in the absence of
outside regulation, will reject sound reason and destroy themselves. It is absurd to
assume that labor leaders are not aware of the fact that the union's vital interests are
closely interrelated with the interests of the plant it works for. There can be little
doubt that where both parties realize the beneficial values of the inclusion of a no-strike
provision in the contract they will provide for it, without any governmental interference.
The fact that the vast majority of labor contracts contain no-strike clauses is proof that
there is no need for creating such provisions by legislative power, as advocated by the
Wilson case.
